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**Textile manufacturing in eight developing countries:  
How far does the business environment explain firms' productive  
inefficiency?**

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**Abstract****Textile manufacturing in eight developing countries: how far does the business environment explain firms' productive inefficiency?**

Production frontiers and inefficiency determinants are estimated by using stochastic models. Textile manufacturing is considered for a sample of eight developing countries encompassing about one thousand firms. We find that the most influential individual inefficiency determinants relate to in-house organization. Both access to financing and infrastructural services (e.g. power supply, modern information technologies...) also matter. Information about determinants is then regrouped into three broad categories (e.g. managerial organization, economic environment, institutions) by using principal component analyses. Results do not reject the hypothesis that managerial know-how and the quality of institutions are the most important determinants. The impact of the external economic environment is of less importance although statistically significant. Sector-based simulations are then proposed in order to assess productivity gains which would occur if firms had the opportunity to evolve in most favorable environments within the sample. Domestic and international production contexts are considered, respectively. When referring to domestic benchmarks, the contribution of in-house organization prevails as the main source of gains for the eight countries. The role of institutions proves dominant for Egypt and India when focusing on international simulations.

**Key words:** Textile; firms; technical efficiency; organizational know-how; productivity; institutions; external economic environment; one step stochastic frontier method

## I. Introduction

Competitiveness can be a “dangerous obsession” to say it in Krugman’s (1994) words, but it is a paramount constraint for firm survival and the long run domestic development. Beyond the impact of macroeconomic policy, particularly the exchange rate instrument that helps to attain this objective through relative prices, competitiveness mainly depends on the productive performance (Dollar and Wolff 1993). Firm productivity, which is influenced by producers’ behavior and the external environment, is therefore the best overall measure of the long run competitiveness. Based on a standardized questionnaire covering a wide range of countries, World Bank surveys about the *Investment Climate Assessment* (ICA) have encouraged the emergence of an empirical literature on firm productivity levels at the international level. Recent papers by Dollar *et al* (2005, 2006) but also by Eifert *et al* (2007) fall into this category.

The present study relies on the empirical exploration of firms’ data for textile manufacturing in eight developing countries in the early two thousands: Brazil (2003), Ecuador (2003), Egypt (2004), India (2000), Morocco (2004), Pakistan (2002), South Africa (2003), Sri-Lanka (2004). Microeconomic statistical information has been pooled to constitute an international panel. We make use of the technical inefficiency concept and appraise the respective importance of economic, institutional and in-house organizational determinants on firms’ productivity levels. Four reasons underlie the interest for textile manufacturing. (i) First of all, it is one of the most important manufacturing sectors in the developing countries studied. For example, production and transformation of fibers account for more than one third of the added value or formal employment in Morocco and Egypt, encompassing several hundreds of firms. (ii) Secondly, textile manufacturing is strongly exposed to the implications of the process of globalization. Competition increased with the end of the *Multifibre Agreement* which restricted exports from China and India over thirty years (1974-2005). New competitive pressures resulted from this evolution with world prices tending to fall in terms of US dollars. To face this price erosion, firms’ productivity has to increase to preserve profitability. (iii) Thirdly, the heterogeneity of products is also rather less than in other sectors, although in some middle income economies product differentiation forms a strategy of upgrading to respond to competition from low labor cost emerging countries. (iv) Lastly, and related to the previous argument, technology differs somewhat across firms and countries, but heterogeneity is rather less than in more sophisticated sectors.

This paper focuses on the measurement and explanation of technical inefficiencies or relative firms' productivity levels. World Bank Investment Climate (ICA) surveys possess valuable characteristics including the use of a standard questionnaire providing homogeneous data on firms' production, investment and employment decisions. ICA surveys also cover various factors dependent upon public regulation, governance, and access to finance or infrastructural services. First of all, the "one-step" formulation of stochastic production frontiers (SFA) is adopted by considering three categories of inefficiency determinants (e.g. economic, institutional and in-house organizational factors). In-house organizational factors are found to be important. Entrepreneurship matters more than external economic factors which are captured by a limited number of variables reflecting access to financing, the quality of public services or the size of the city where firms are located. The role of institutions is more ambiguous. On the one hand, they have a limited effect over firms or domestic geography but, on the other hand, they have a strong impact on the determination of productivity differences between countries, especially when *Doing Business* information complements ICA data. Secondly, stochastic frontier models and inefficiency determinants are used to predict potential productivity gains if firms operate in a homogeneous context. These predictions are based on the adjusted efficiency measures as proposed by Coelli et al (1999). These adjustments are made in respect of the most favorable production context. Domestic and international scenarios are then successively considered. The impact of organizational factors is strongly prevalent in the nationwide scenario. Institutional factors prove to be dominant for Egypt and India when the international framework is considered. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the sector-based data surveys for the eight above mentioned countries. We draw attention to the main characteristics of firms' production but also to their productive environment. Section 3 briefly describes the stochastic frontier methodology and the adjusted efficiency measures. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical results. Section 5 concludes by summing up the main results.

## **II. The sector-based ICA data**

At firms' level, productivity depends on a wide range of factors. For convenience, the information from World Bank ICA surveys can be regrouped into three categories, hereafter called g- categories.

***The external economic environment.***

The quality of roads, transport, telecommunication and power provision varies considerably including within the boundaries of a country. Many authors have referred to the loss of economic efficiency due to the failure in the provision of public utilities. The ICA questionnaire tries to appraise what these constraints mean through qualitative questions about the severity of the problems they have to manage. Unreliable public supply leads to excessive costs. Firms with easy access to electricity supply, modern telecommunication services and efficient transport tend to invest more intensively and prove more productive. Competition is also an important channel and increases with the degree of openness. Although the causality is subject to debate, the dominant idea is that the higher the export ratio of sales, the higher the productive performance. By producing for external markets, competition provides a permanent challenge. The situation is quite different when production is assigned to domestic customers, and firms benefit from import restrictions. ICA surveys incorporate several items addressing these points.

The degree of openness being given, the size of the city as measured by the number of inhabitants where the firm is located is also an influential element reflecting the acuteness of the local competition. The ICA questionnaire is coded in such a way to distinguish 5 types of towns, from the capital city to the smallest agglomeration of less than 50,000 inhabitants. Larger markets attract more firms, which makes competition tougher. This variable potentially interacts with the quality of infrastructures. In remote areas with a low density of population, bottlenecks in the delivery of infrastructural services can be a natural protection. It may benefit to producers against the surplus of consumers enhancing excess profits or a waste of resources. A “quiet life” and managerial inefficiency are likely as well as a non-optimal scale of production when firms evolve in areas with a small population. Agglomeration economies are thought to arise from a variety of mechanisms. Indeed, on the demand side, large agglomerations mean that consumers have the possibility of comparing products with a price-quality criterion; on the supply side, concentration means the possibility for similar firms to share the same suppliers, the existence of thick labour markets ironing out firm-level shocks or facilitating matching, or the possibility to learn from the experience and innovation of others (Duranton and Puga, 2004). As shown by Fujita et al (1999), the grouping of firms, which goes hand in hand with large cities, enhances external economies of scale and stimulates dynamic competitiveness. To survive in the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” environment, organizations are more likely to adopt the most efficient productive

conventions they encounter. A higher average productivity of firms and workers in large cities can result from a stronger Darwinian selection of firms.

Access to financing potentially plays an important role on the productivity level. Manufacturing activities are spread out over time. The adoption of the efficient technology requires investment today with the payoffs coming later; even ongoing productive activity requires inputs in advance with revenues realized at a later point in time. Inadequacies in finance create barriers and impede new entry into markets. These inadequacies limit the competitive discipline facing incumbent firms, dulling their incentives to innovate and improve their productivity. Developed financial markets reduce firms' reliance on their own cash flows and money from families and friends. As a result, they lead to faster growth in productivity (see World Bank, 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000). Two variables have been considered in this paper to appraise the role of financial services. As regard the overdraft facility, as supplier credits, it is linked to the working capital and the possibility for firms to manage liquidity constraints, to face the instabilities of the environment. The access to financing for longer periods has a more permanent impact. It reflects the ability for firms to snap up opportunities to invest, to incur large sunk costs to enter into export markets.

### ***The institutional environment.***

Institutions define the rules of the economic game. They shape activity and have a strong bearing on the organization of production as well as investment decisions. Governments play a key role in providing public facilities and formal rules, such as laws delineating property rights or the judicial institutions liable to enforce these rights in a transparent way. Conflicting with this normative representation of the State, political *economy* suggests that politicians and public bureaus can increase transaction costs. Potential arbitrariness takes many forms. The standard ICA questionnaire stresses this dimension through a wide range of items such as State intervention and red tape of public administration, corruption, cronyism and more generally, the inability to uphold public order. Through the ICA questionnaire, entrepreneurs are asked to give their opinion on the business-government relations in several fields affecting production activities. They have to assess the labor regulations and external trade facilities through the number of days they need to import or export. Firms are also asked to state how confident they are in the capacity of the judicial system to resolve conflict and enforce contractual and property rights in business disputes. A major problem with ICA surveys is that many firms do not respond to some questions. Average regional perceptions that can be

considered by firms' size category can be used as relevant determinants under the assumption that this problem is the same for all firms.

The ICA database can also be extended with the country-based information of the World Bank's *Doing Business* report. Institutions are then considered homogeneous across a country whatever the sector of activity and wherever the firm is located. This option can be restrictive. In the 2005 issue, the *World Development Report* showed that a national law can be applied differently within a country. The time taken to transfer property title in Brazil varies between 15 days in Brasilia and 65 days in Salvador. Even within a single location, the same conditions can affect firms differently according to their activities. The combination of ICA surveys and *Doing Business* might be seen as a pragmatic solution to overcome statistical problems. *Doing Business* collects information on the number of calendar days, the number of procedures and the cost required to complete various types of business transactions. These procedures may be in relation to starting or closing a business, dealing with licenses and registering property, trading across borders, making contracts or firing workers. All these elements complement firms' perceptions and potentially reduce the subjectivity underlying their answers.

### ***Managerial know-how and in-house organization.***

There is no clear-cut conclusion about the relationship between productive efficiency and firm size. Large formal companies have potential advantages. They are intrinsically capable of coping with informational imperfections. However some authors consider that small organizations are more appropriate to manage severe market and government failures. In this paper, firm size has been considered through the number of permanent workers and alternatively through three conventional categories stratifying firms according to their employment level (less than 20, from 20 to 99, 100 and more). Organizational or managerial efficiency also depends on the quality of human resources including sector or experience within the firm of the top manager. The human capital quality of the firm as measured by the percentage of the workforce having a high-level of education also matters. Several variables can be used to capture this effect according to the number of school-years from the elementary to the university levels. The same conclusion applies to the percentage of the total permanent employees who benefit from in-house formal training. The production performance is also determined by the mobilization of new information technologies. In some large economies, such as China and India, the World Bank's Investment Climate surveys found that garment manufacturers are more productive when telecommunication services are



better. The availability of these services relates to the exogenous economic environment. But a regular use of a Website is more focused on the demand side, revealing firms' ability to achieve quick and cheap interaction with customers and suppliers. Foreign companies can be seen as an additional source of know-how connected with good practice in management. They generally reduce the fixed costs of producing technological innovations and the marginal cost of their replication in the domestic environment. Moreover, foreign firms or their participation in domestic firms' capital can be instrumental in having access to external markets more easily.

A selection of the main Investment Climate variables is presented in Table 1. We regroup them into the three above-mentioned g-categories; the number of firms being given in parentheses under the variable. On average, the number of South African firms is narrow, no more than 16, and they are both large and open, as shown by the export sales ratio or the participation of foreigners in the ownership. The opposite situation is observed in Pakistan, where firms mainly produce to satisfy domestic demand and do not solicit foreign financial participation. The role of new information technologies which we appraise by the percentage of computer users and access to the Internet is not necessarily correlated with size, but seems to be higher in countries with the highest *per capita* income GDP. The difference between Ecuador, 2180 dollars in 2004, and India (620\$) clearly illustrates this point.

Except in South Africa and Morocco, some constraints on public services are strong. This is the case for power supply. It is especially damageable for small firms' productivity level as the size of generators tends to be larger than the capacity required by their potential production. Electricity problems prove of importance in Pakistan and Sri-Lanka. It is also significant for an upper-middle income country such as Brazil. As regards financing, the constraint is abnormally high. It conflicts sometimes with information about overdraft facilities although the liquidity constraints are quite different from the time frame underlying the financing of investments. In Morocco, although 67% of the 148 respondent firms benefit from overdraft facilities, more than 75% of producers complain about structural problems concerning access to commercial bank financing. A similar comment applies to Ecuador and, surprisingly, to Brazil.

Information about the quality of the institutional environment is quite poor. Corruption seems to be significant for 67% of entrepreneurs in Brazil, much more than in Egypt (43.0%). It is also a severe constraint in Pakistan (41.7%) although informal payments are limited to about 2% of sales, much less than in Ecuador where this phenomenon accounts for 8% with only 33% of firms complaining about corruption. The absence of any normative reference

about what the rules are or should be, as well as the subjectivity underlying firms' perceptions, is likely to be the main difficulty in determining the impact of the institutional environment using ICA data.

**Table 1 - Main variables reflecting organizational, economic and institutional environments: country means (number of firms in parentheses)**

Countries	Brazil	Ecuador	Egypt	India	Sri Lanka	Morocco	Pakistan	South Africa
<b>Managerial know-how and in-house organization</b>								
Size (number of permanent workers)	181,8 (91)	104,7 (21)	133,0 (92)	224,2 (195)	66,0 (62)	92,2 (148)	87,7 (276)	665,9 (16)
Export (% of sales)	8,5 (91)	13,7 (11)	8,4 (92)	9,0 (183)	16,0 (62)	28,9 (148)	6,3 (268)	12,1 (16)
Foreign ownership (% of capital)	5,6 (91)	5,7 (21)	2,0 (92)	0,4 (194)	11,1 (62)	12,0 (148)	0,4 (276)	17,7 (16)
Education (% workforce, more 12 years)	8,7 (90)	21,2 (20)	10,7 (91)	17,2 (186)	3,2 (62)	8,5 (148)	4,9 (275)	8,8 (16)
Computer users (% of workforce)	19,5 (91)	22,4 (21)		16,1 (190)	8,9 (62)	11,0 (146)	5,4 (276)	20,5 (16)
Use of website (% of total firms)	76,9 (91)	61,9 (21)	21,7 (92)	25,9 (185)	19,4 (62)	15,3 (144)	6,9 (276)	62,5 (16)
<b>External economic environment</b>								
Electricity constraint +	33,0 (91)	28,6 (21)	28,3 (91)	28,7 (195)	37,1 (62)	8,1 (148)	42,4 (276)	12,5 (16)
Telecom constraint +	6,6 (91)	14,3 (21)	4,3 (92)	5,1 (195)	8,1 (62)	2,0 (148)	6,5 (276)	0,0 (16)
Transport constraint +	16,5 (91)	9,5 (21)	3,3 (90)	11,3 (195)	4,8 (62)	3,4 (148)	11,2 (276)	18,8 (16)
Financial constraint +	57,1 (91)	42,9 (20)	20,7 (66)	17,4 (195)	9,7 (62)	75,7 (148)	42,8 (275)	6,3 (16)
Overdraft facility (% of total firms)	78,0 (91)	76,2 (21)	6,5 (92)	65,1 (195)	64,5 (62)	67,6 (148)	18,5 (276)	100,0 (11)
<b>Institutional environment</b>								
Corruption +	67,0 (91)	33,3 (21)	43,5 (89)	36,9 (194)	9,7 (62)	15,5 (148)	41,7 (276)	6,3 (16)
Days for import	12,1 (30)	23,1 (12)	6,3 (26)	7,2 (54)	4,3 (21)	2,9 (97)	14,3 (21)	8,6 (13)
Days for export	6,4 (34)	12,2 (10)	4,5 (17)	4,6 (59)	2,6 (20)	1,7 (66)	12,4 (30)	4,8 (13)
Informal payments (% of sales)		8,5 (11)	5,4 (17)		0,1 (57)		2,2 (276)	0,0 (16)

Source. *World Bank*, ICA databases. + Percentage of firms mentioning the constraint as a major obstacle or a very severe constraint. Number of firms given in parentheses.

### III. SFA and Adjusted efficiencies for environment

The first objective is both to measure and explain firms' technical inefficiency through three g-categories of determinants reflecting organizational, economic and institutional factors. Following Coelli *et al* (1999)'s method, our second objective is to predict firm's production performance when all organizations share the most favorable environment.

The stochastic frontier model takes the following form:

$$Y_i = f(X_i, D, \beta) e^{V_i - U_i(Z_i, \delta)} \quad (1)$$

$Y_i$  is the output for the  $i$ -th firm and  $X_i$  a vector of inputs.  $D$  reflects country dummy variables capturing the heterogeneity of the production technology across countries<sup>1</sup>. Labour ( $L$ ) and capital ( $K$ ) have been retained as inputs and  $f(\cdot)$  is a suitable functional form. The stochastic frontier specification decomposes the total error term that we denote  $\varepsilon$  into two components: the usual random noise  $V$  and the asymmetric error term  $U(Z, \delta)$ , which depends on the inefficiency determinants, the so-called  $z$ -factors that affect the inefficiency distribution denoted  $U$  (see, Battese and Coelli 1995):

$$U_i = Z_i' \delta + \eta_i \quad (2)$$

$Z_i' = (1, z_{2i}, \dots, z_{pi})$  is the vector of the  $p-1$  variables ( $z_j$ ) associated with the three categories of inefficiency determinants.  $\eta_i$  is a half normal variable  $|N(0, \sigma_u^2)|$  and  $\delta$  a  $(1 \times p)$  vector of parameters to estimate. These variables are assumed to be not correlated with the error components ( $U, V$ ).

The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. An endogeneity problem may arise from some variables, inefficient producers justifying a low technical efficiency by the poor quality of power supply or the acuteness of public corruption. To address this issue, a first method consists in using regional sector averages of the endogeneous variable (see Commander and Svejnar, 2008). The validity of this method depends upon both, the presence of poor and good productive performers in each region and a suitable correlation between the regional average and the endogeneous variable<sup>2</sup>. An alternative method is the classical instrumental technique. Instruments have to be found, correlated with the specific  $z$ -factors

<sup>1</sup> The panel data associate both firms and countries. Country dummies are introduced to determine the heterogeneity that is not explained by technical inefficiency factors.

<sup>2</sup> Regional averages concerning characteristics of the external environment are also useful to complete firms missing information on non-behavioral  $z$ -factors.

but independent from the inefficiency component. Predicted values for the endogenous z-determinants, denoted  $\hat{z}$ , are introduced in the likelihood function to be maximized. Although the estimator is consistent, the bootstrapping procedure has to be used to provide correct standard errors. The procedure is as follows:

**Step 1:** The frontier is estimated by the maximum likelihood method (MLE) with instrumental variables ( $\hat{z}$ ). Estimates of the two distribution variances are obtained ( $\hat{\sigma}_v^2$  and  $\hat{\sigma}_u^2$ ). The inefficiency components ( $\hat{u}_i$ ) are estimated according to Jondrow *et al* (1980)'s method.

**Step 2:** For each bootstrap iteration  $b=1, \dots, B$ , we generate a Gaussian random sample  $\hat{v}_i^b \rightarrow N(0, \hat{\sigma}_v^2)$  according to its estimated characteristics in step 1<sup>3</sup>.

**Step 3:** New bootstrapped samples for the endogenous variable are generated according to the equation:  $Y_i^b = f(X_i, D, \hat{\beta})e^{\hat{v}_i^b - \hat{u}_i}$ , where  $\hat{\beta}$  are the estimated parameters of the technology obtained in step 1.

**Step 4:** Each bootstrapped sample is estimated by the MLE. The same experience is iterated ( $B=500$  times), allowing the calculation of the empirical parameters' standard errors.

Two efficiency measures are derived from the frontier model according to whether they are adjusted or not in respect of production in the most favorable environment. Our method of adjustment is based on Coelli *et al*'s (1999) but is different on two points. First of all, the reference environment is defined by the 95% quantile when the factor is favorable (e.g., access to an overdraft facility) and the 5% quantile in the opposite case (e.g., severe infrastructural constraints). The choice of a quantile avoids the sensitivity to outliers. Secondly, while Coelli *et al*. (1999) refer to a linear combination of all factors, our adjusted measures are made according to each of the three above-mentioned g-categories of the production environment respectively. For example, efficiency predictions with good organizational factors are obtained keeping the other two categories unchanged. The following formulas then apply: (3), (4), (5).

$$TE_i^a = \frac{Y_i}{f(X_i, \beta)e^{-U_i(Z_i^a, \delta)}} = e^{-U_i(Z_i^a, \delta)} \quad (3)$$

where  $z_i^a$  is the adjusted vector of inefficiency determinants. The adjustment of the  $z_j$  variable depends on the sign of the  $\delta_j$  coefficient. If  $\delta_j < 0$ , the  $z_j$  variable has a positive

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<sup>3</sup> The same method cannot be adopted for the u term as the Jondrow *et al* estimates do not provide perfect predictions of inefficiencies. This method does not provide estimates of  $u_i$  but the mean of the distribution from which  $u_i$  is generated (see Greene, 2008).

impact on efficiency. Then, firms' performances are adjusted according to the environment given by the upper quantile of this variable. In the opposite case ( $\delta_j > 0$ ), adjustment is made by the lower quantile<sup>4</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} z_{ji}^a &= \max(z_{ji}, q_{z_j}^{(1-\alpha)}) \text{ if } \delta_j < 0 \\ z_{ji}^a &= \min(z_{ji}, q_{z_j}^{(\alpha)}) \text{ if } \delta_j > 0 \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where  $q_{z_j}^{(\alpha)}$  is the  $\alpha$ -quantile of the variable  $z_j$ . Coelli et al (1999) report the following adjusted inefficiency measure:

$$TE = E(\exp(-U_i^c) | \varepsilon_i) = \left\{ \exp\left[-\mu_i^a + 0.5\sigma_*^2\right] \right\} \left\{ \Phi\left[\frac{\mu_i^a}{\sigma_*} - \sigma_*\right] / \Phi\left[\frac{\mu_i^a}{\sigma_*}\right] \right\} \quad (5)$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  denotes the distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable.  $\mu_i^a = (1 - \gamma)Z_i^{*a} \delta - \gamma \varepsilon_i$ ;  $\sigma_*^2 = \gamma(1 - \gamma)(\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)$ ,  $\gamma = \sigma_u^2 / (\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)$ .  $Z_i^{*a}$  is the adjusted vector of systematic influences on technical inefficiencies (4). By replacing the adjusted vector  $Z_i^{*a}$  by the firm observed vector  $Z_i'$  in (5), unadjusted inefficiency measures are obtained, the ratio of the adjusted to unadjusted measures providing the impact of the environments.

#### IV. Empirical results

We comment upon the stochastic frontier estimations and then simulate the productivity gains that would result from the possibility for firms to evolve in most favorable environments we observe in the sample.

##### A. Stochastic frontiers with technical inefficiency determinants

Investment Climate surveys rely on large random samples of firms that reflect the true sector-based population of each country. Combining firms and countries has some advantages. First of all, statistical inference can be carried out on average country distributions of inefficiency, reducing the variance of the residual term we would observe in a *pure* cross-sectional analysis. Secondly, through the set of country-dummies, we check the time invariant heterogeneity common to all firms. The empirical work relates to eight developing countries with a total of 899 firms allowing the estimation of a standard production frontier (e.g. without the z-factors). When inefficiency determinants are incorporated, according to the specifications of the model, the sample size varies from 840 to 821 firms. The loss of

<sup>4</sup> For firms evolving in an environment beyond (below) the upper (lower) quantile, adjusted and non-adjusted efficiencies measures are the same.

observations results from missing variables. This attrition can be a source of a selection bias affecting the shape of production technology and/or the z-factors influencing technical inefficiency. The potentiality of a bias justifies the use of Heckman's procedure<sup>5</sup>, and the introduction of the inverse Mills ratio in the models. The sample on which simulations of section IV are based includes 821 firms. By country, the number of enterprises is given in parentheses: Ecuador (11), South Africa (16), Sri-Lanka (55), Egypt (88), Brazil (90), Morocco (144), India (155), and Pakistan (262).

<sup>6</sup> Table 2 provides the regression results of the "one step" stochastic frontier. The Cobb Douglas functional form is assumed to describe the production technology<sup>7</sup>. To check the heterogeneity of technology across countries, fixed effects are present in the specification of the production function. Statistically significant these effects are not reported in the table<sup>8</sup>. Fixed effects have not been incorporated among the z-factors as we may expect that they are correlated with the county-distributions of efficiencies. The three columns differ by the way the inverse Mills ratio is introduced as an extra explanatory variable. The parameter associated to this extra regressor being not statistically different from zero there is no evidence of selection bias. The sum of input elasticities does not reject constant returns to scale. The labor coefficient is about 0.67 and reflects what we generally find in the literature for the relative contribution of wages in value-added, between 60 % and 70%. The standard error of the inefficiency component ( $\sigma_u$ ) is significant and does not reject the relevance of the stochastic frontier model (SFA) against the alternative classical production function hypothesis where the error term is a classical random disturbance. The conclusion we draw from the breakdown of this error is that about 30% of the total variance of the error can be attributed to firms' technical inefficiency<sup>9</sup>.

For the impact of inefficiency determinants, the potential endogeneity bias has been checked by using the *instrumental variable* technique. Standard errors have been bootstrapped according to the semi parametric method we discussed in section III. Appendix 2 reports the

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<sup>5</sup> The estimation results of Heckman's first step selection provide a high percentage of correct predictions (Appendix 1).

<sup>7</sup> The mean technical efficiency measures that are reported in Table 4 are obtained under a hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas technology. The use of a more flexible technology such as the translogarithmic one did not reveal any significant variation. The coefficients of the interaction terms proved invariant and those of the primary inputs very close to the Cobb-Douglas coefficients. The Spearman Rank correlation between the two efficiency distributions is 0.98.

<sup>8</sup> Although textile products benefit a strong homogeneity than other manufacturing goods, we alternatively tried to test heterogeneity according to the main firm product line but with a major inconvenience, the loss of a good deal of observations as many enterprises did not provide information about this specific question.

<sup>9</sup> This percentage is calculated as follows :  $\sigma_u^2 / (\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)$

first step results for the three instrumented variables. In Table 2, we refer to predicted variables by (+). Perception depicting the external environment (e.g. electricity supply constraint, severity of the corruption phenomenon...) has been replaced by firms' regional capacities according to firms' size (++) to limit the risk of endogeneity as well as measurement errors when firm perceptions are considered.



**Table 2**  
**Stochastic frontiers incorporating individual z-factors**

	Value-added (Model 1)	Value-added (Model 2)	Value-added (Model 3)
<b><i>Production function</i></b>			
Log (labor)	0.666 (0.048)***	0.669 (0.048)***	0.669 (0.047)***
Log (capital)	0.321 (0.022)***	0.322 (0.022)***	0.322 (0.022)***
Inverse Mills ratio		-0.402 (0.541)	-0.324 (1.060)
Constant	2.653 (0.304)***	2.655 (0.337)***	2.647 (0.400)***
<b><i>Inefficiency determinants</i></b>			
Size	0.103 (0.109)	0.089 (0.110)	0.116 (0.108)
Foreign ownership (% of capital)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.052)
Export (% of sales)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Overdraft facility+	-1.002 (0.304)***	-1.006 (0.308)***	-1.007 (0.309)***
Electricity constraint ++	0.181 (0.076)**	0.189 (0.075)**	0.189 (0.080)**
Education (% workforce, more than 12 years)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)
Financing constraint +	0.065 (0.064)	0.059 (0.067)	0.061 (0.065)
Internet services +	-0.955 (0.415)**	-0.977 (0.420)**	-0.996 (0.442)**
Manager's experience (years, in the sector)	-0.021 (0.008)***	-0.021 (0.008)***	-0.022 (0.008)***
Agglomeration (from large to small cities)	0.133 (0.070)*	0.135 (0.067)*	0.132 (0.069)*
Corruption ++	-0.077 (0.063)	-0.077 (0.062)	-0.075 (0.063)
Constant	0.691 (0.462)	0.724 (0.478)	0.715 (0.558)
Inverse Mills ratio			-0.294 (1.310)
Observations	840	840	840
$\sigma_u$	0.56 (0.204)	0.57 (0.199)	0.56 (0.212)
$\sigma_v$	0.86 (0.061)	0.86 (0.067)	0.86 (0.075)
Log Likelihood	-1146.7	-1146.7	-1146.2

N.B: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses, \*significant at 10%; \*\* 5%; \*\*\* 1%. Regressions include country dummies in the production function.

**PS:** ++, average regional mean according to firm size; +, predicted variables. Regressions for instrumentation of the endogenous variables are provided in Appendix 2. All the constraints have been calculated from answers: major obstacle, very severe obstacle.

The possibility for firms to benefit from overdraft facilities proves strongly correlated with relative productivity. Loans and overdrafts potentially mean fewer risks of disruption in the supply of raw materials and intermediary consumption, better ability to finance working capital and new investments. The empirical model also displays the significant impact of electricity constraints. The role of this factor has been evidenced in several studies including in Dollar *et al.* (2006). The influence of the agglomeration positively matters at a 90% level of confidence. In the enterprise survey, this variable being coded from large to small cities, the impact is consistent with hypotheses of agglomeration economies and/or firm selection hypotheses. Two in-house-organizational factors provide an statistically significant explanation of relative productivities. Top managers' experience, as measured by the number of years at the head of firms, points to a "learning by doing" effect while internet services highlight dynamic behavior in stimulating innovation and efficiently managing new information technologies.

Several firms' characteristics in ICA surveys do not prove relevant, including most variables reflecting firms' or regional perceptions concerning the institutional environment. These variables can be correlated with per capita GDP levels and then with country fixed effects. Firm size as well as the ownership structure or the export ratios are not correlated with firms' inefficiency. The non-significance remains when instrumentation is used, when we leave out the export ratio or foreign participation (see Commander and Svejnar, 2008)<sup>10</sup>. As variables can be inter-correlated, previous results do not necessarily mean the absence of any correlation with technical inefficiency. By restricting the specification to a subset of indicators the omitted variable bias potentially arises (see Bastos and Nasir, 2004). An alternative method is the use of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This method has the additional and valuable advantage of encapsulating the impact of all inefficiency determinants in each of the three indicators based on earlier defined g-categories (e.g., external economic environment, institutional environment, organizational know-how and in-house organization factors). The *principal components* ( $p_j$ ) are orthogonal linear combinations of the original variables. A weighted average of these combinations is used to

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<sup>10</sup> In this working paper, Commander and Svejnar refer to the 2005 and 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. Firms are from a wide range of sectors in 26 transition countries.

construct an aggregate indicator ( $PCIND^g$ ) where  $p_j^g$  is the principal component specific to each of the  $g$ -categories of variables and  $\lambda_j^g$ , the  $j$ -th eigenvalue of the covariance matrix<sup>11</sup>.

$$PCIND^g = \frac{\lambda_1^g}{\sum_{j=1}^{M_g} \lambda_j^g} p_1^g + \dots + \frac{\lambda_{M_g}^g}{\sum_{j=1}^{M_g} \lambda_j^g} p_{M_g}^g \quad (6)$$


For the institutional environment, ICA surveys suffer from being based on firms' perceptions which may be affected by a subjective assessment of institutions and especially the difficulty for entrepreneurs to have a common reference situation of what can be considered as a suitable situation. Therefore, the institutional  $PCIND^g$  index has been calculated by incorporating specific additional country information provided by expert assessments obtained from the World Bank's *Doing Business*. Figure 1 suggests that some variables of *Doing Business* are highly correlated with average efficiency distributions between countries as defined by a standard stochastic frontier without z-determinants<sup>12</sup>. The regression slopes mean that transaction costs potentially handicap production performance at all phases of firms' lifetime (e.g., starting a business, hiring and firing workers, obtaining credit, making contracts, winding up a business...)

For each of the three  $g$ -categories of factors, the different principal components that we consider for  $PCIND^g$  explain at least 70% of the data variation. Appendix 3 reports the PCA indicators as well as the variables we used for their construction. In carrying out these PCA, previous treatments for variables suspected to be endogeneous have been used.

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<sup>11</sup> The  $\lambda_j^g$  are usually presented in descending order. In a first step, and for each  $g$ -group of factors, we select the  $M_g$  number of principal components accounting for at least 70% of the cumulative variance. In a second step, we construct a weighted average, with weights being proportional to the contribution of each component to the explanation of the total variance. For the calculation of  $PCIND^g$ , all the variables have been standardized in order to present them in the same unit of measurement.

<sup>12</sup> Figure 1 refers to a larger sample of countries than the eight studied. The initial sample restriction was made because of the incompleteness of some country-based data that did not permit an estimation of the frontier with z-factors.

**Figure 1 - Technical efficiency means and a selection of the main *Doing Business* variables**

**Nota Bene:** Each graph plots the indicated governance indicator of the World Bank's *Doing Business* (horizontal axis) against the country mean efficiency scores (vertical axis).

The following sample of countries is considered: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Sri-Lanka, Thailand and Zambia.

**Table 3**  
**Stochastic frontiers with principal components indices : z-determinants regrouped into three broad categories of factors.**

	Value-added (Model 4)	Value-added (Model 5)	Value-added (Model 6)
<b><i>Production function</i></b>			
Log (labor)	0.679 (0.038)***	0.670 (0.033)***	0.671 (0.034)***
Log (capital)	0.314 (0.020)***	0.312 (0.018)***	0.312 (0.018)***
Inverse Mills ratio	-0.576 (1.558)	-2.221 (2.345)	-1.274 (0.613)**
Constant	2.616 (0.316)***	2.900 (0.328)***	2.817 (0.314)***
<b><i>Inefficiency determinants (PCINDs)</i></b>			
Managerial know-how( in-house organization)	-0.873 (0.341)***	-0.616 (0.153)***	-0.628 (0.132)***
Economic environment	0.206 (0.074)***	0.146 (0.049)***	0.148 (0.047)***
Institutional environment		0.549 (0.217)***	0.419 (0.164)***
Inverse Mills ratio	0.974 (1.792)	-1.422 (2.503)	
Constant	0.190 (0.588)	1.340 (0.607)**	1.024 (0.426)***
Observations	821	821	821
$\sigma_u$	0.62 (0.204)	0.72 (0.174)	0.69 (0.185)
$\sigma_v$	0.85 (0.068)	0.75 (0.103)	0.77 (0.097)
Log Likelihood	-1124.8	-1121.4	-1123.0

Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at: \*, 10%; \*\*, 5%; \*\*\*, 1%. Regressions incorporate fixed effects at the level of the production technology. For the institutional environment, the *PCIND* results from the combination of the *Doing Business* information and ICA variables reflecting corruption. For more details see: Appendix 3.

Table 3 shows the “one step” frontier estimates with the aggregate information (*PCINDs*). Correct *MLE* standard errors of coefficients have been bootstrapped by using the semi-parametric procedure (see section III). Country-fixed effects are not reported in this table but are introduced in the production technology. The sample selection bias has been tested on both the frontier and the z-factors through the inverse Mills ratio. Except for model 6, but with a negligible impact on the coefficients of Cobb Douglas technology, this bias is rejected. Again, the hypothesis of the frontier proves statistically relevant with an efficiency term ( $\sigma_u$ ) accounting for about 30% of the variance of the total error term. In comparison with previous regressions where individual z-factors were considered, the coefficient of the production technology is marginally modified. Moreover, all *PCINDs* are significant at the 99% level. Variables being standardized through the principal component analysis, coefficients relating to *PCIND<sup>s</sup>* have the same unit of measurement simplifying the interpretation of relative impacts. Two or three *PCIND<sup>s</sup>* are considered in the regression results, according to whether the role of institutions is considered or not. The expected positive signs are found for the severity of the constraints underlying the institutional factors and the external economic environment, highest constraints increasing firms’ inefficiency. On the contrary, a negative sign is obtained for the *PCIND<sup>s</sup>* reflecting the positive correlation between the quality of in-house managerial environment and efficiency. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that in-house organizational impact is the most influential, followed by the role of institutions. The economic environment, mainly composed of appreciations based on infrastructure and financial services, is much less relevant.


Figure 2 and Table 4, which are both established from model 4 of Table 3, show that the South African (ZAF) textile manufacturing sector is the most technically efficient one within the sample with a low standard deviation, suggesting homogeneity of efficiency over a small number of firms which are larger than those of the other countries (Table 1). In Brazil as well as in Ecuador, enterprises are also quite efficient with an average productivity gap of about 10% with respect to South Africa. Morocco ranks fourth with a gap of less than 20%. It is worth noticing that Asian countries, i.e. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are significantly below the *best practice*. These three countries account for 57% of the number of firms underlying this empirical work. Textile manufacturing in Pakistan is by far the least productive of the eight countries with an average firms’ productivity level two times less than in ZAF.

**Table 4**  
**Summary statistics about technical efficiencies (model 4)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Standard deviation</b>	<b>Coefficient of variation</b>	<b>Number of firms</b>
Brazil (BRA)	0.705	0.730	0.116	16.56	90
Ecuador(ECU)	0.688	0.675	0.077	11.23	11
Egypt (EGY)	0.571	0.561	0.152	26.59	88
India (IND)	0.576	0.574	0.156	27.18	155
Sri Lanka (LKA)	0.472	0.447	0.152	32.30	55
Morocco (MAR)	0.640	0.659	0.130	20.28	144
Pakistan (PAK)	0.396	0.353	0.152	38.32	262
South Africa (ZAF)	0.786	0.796	0.045	5.77	16

N.B: efficiencies resulting from model 4, Table 3. The percentage of coefficient of variation is obtained by considering at the country level both the standard deviation and the mean. Technical efficiencies are potentially distributed from zero (fully inefficient) to one (the best practice).

**Figure 2 - International distributions of efficiency measures  
(Two g-categories considered simultaneously)**






If we look at what happens when the quality of institutions is taken into account, when we introduce the hypothesis that productive performance is conditional upon the way the rules are defined and enforced, empirical results are significantly modified (see Table 5 and Figure 3). In other words, the incorporation of the *Doing business* information suggests that productive efficiency of some countries is strongly affected by extensive regulations and weaknesses of public administrations. Although Ecuador is now first before South Africa and Brazil, the ranking as well as the statistical distributions of efficiencies do not change a lot among the most successful countries. The story is very different when focusing on the least efficient sectors, those where the coefficients of variation are the highest. It is clear that textile in India, Pakistan and above all in Egypt potentially suffer a lot from the dysfunctioning of institutions.

**Table 5**  
**Summary statistics about technical efficiencies (model 6)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Standard deviation</b>	<b>Coefficient of variation</b>	<b>Number of firms</b>
Brazil (BRA)	0.605	0.621	0.130	21.56	90
Ecuador (ECU)	0.741	0.737	0.052	7.02	11
Egypt (EGY)	0.110	0.085	0.084	76.68	88
India (IND)	0.277	0.233	0.157	56.75	155
Sri Lanka (LKA)	0.467	0.423	0.161	34.49	55
Morocco (MAR)	0.512	0.534	0.141	27.54	144
Pakistan (PAK)	0.295	0.251	0.149	50.50	262
South Africa (ZAF)	0.722	0.737	0.061	8.56	16


N.B: efficiencies resulting from model 6, Table 3. The percentage of coefficient of variation is obtained by considering at the country level both the standard deviation and the mean. Technical efficiencies are potentially distributed from zero (fully inefficient) to one (the best practice).

**Figure 3 - International distributions of efficiency measures  
(three g-categories considered simultaneously)**



One question that deserves particular attention for both the robustness of our analysis and the relevance of the relative productivity simulations carried out in subsection 4.2 is to ascertain whether the results are sensitive or not for a specific year. In respect of production technology, ICA databases contain the data for the year surveyed and one or two previous years. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the inefficiency determinants as respondents only characterize the current year. Therefore, although some countries were surveyed twice, the “one step” frontier model cannot be estimated under the conventional time-series-cross-sectional panel data form. In a cross sectional analysis, strong assumptions underlie the breakdown of the composed error model in its  $U$  and  $V$  terms. The stability of efficiency distribution as determined by the application of the standard Aigner *et al* (1977)’s specification (e.g., the stochastic frontier model without the  $z$ -factors), was tested for two subsequent years.

**Graph 1 - Kernel distribution of technical efficiency for two subsequent years:**



Efficiency measures being estimated rather than observed, the non-parametric kernel estimates of efficiency density were used on the sample of 899 firms. Kernel distribution reported in graph 1 shows that the two distributions overlap. More formally, the Li (1996) statistics<sup>13</sup> (0.009176), with p-values of 0.496 does not reject the equality of the two empirical distributions.


<sup>13</sup> This statistics follows a standard normal variable

*B. Simulating efficiencies if firms evolve with the best productive environnement*


Technical efficiency is predicted by placing all firms in the 5% most favorable environment we observe in the sample to obtain adjusted efficiency measures (see section III). Simulations are successively carried out with respect to the domestic and the international environment. For these simulations, model 6 of Table 3 has been retained. In each case, the three g-categories of efficiency determinants are considered separately. In other words, the firms' environment benchmark is liable to vary from one g-category to another. Although the international scenario is likely to be speculative (e.g. public institutions and their effectiveness only modify slowly), these simulations demonstrate where producers and governments need to promote efforts in order to improve firms' productivity levels<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> The same exercise was carried out with no significant variation with the translog specification. Results can be provided upon request.

**Figure 4 - Productive efficiencies within the best domestic environment**

In the domestic framework, total productive efficiency gains range from less than 10% in South Africa to about 70% in Egypt (Figure 4). These marked differences reflect statistical dispersion, which tends to be more pronounced in the lowest *per capita* GDP countries. If we look at the decomposition of these gains, the in-house organizational source is systematically the most important one. For Moroccan firms, this environment accounts for about 90% of the 23% average expected productivity gains. For the eight countries, the relative contribution of this g-category exceeds 70% of the total cumulated productivity improvement. The economic environment ranks second, except for Morocco where it is outperformed by the role of institutions. Within this empirical frame, we don't find that modifying institutions would enhance a noticeable impact. When moving from the existing to the best domestic institutional environment, productive efficiency does not improve more than 10%. There is of course a logical dimension in this result. *Doing Business* information only gives a nationwide picture of the institutional environment. The international perspective has the advantage of increasing the variance of all variables including institutions.

**Figure 5 - Productive efficiencies within the best international environment**



Adjusting efficiencies to the best favorable international conditions changes the story (Figure 5). Institutions rank first for three countries with adjusted predictions enhancing strong efficiency gains. For Egypt, the productivity level is multiplied by nearly 4 and the quality of institutions accounts for about 50% of this improvement. Although simulations for India are less spectacular, the average productivity level would more than double. For this country, the relative contribution of institutions represents more than half the total of cumulative gains. In Egypt and India, the quality of institutions then overrides everything else. This is not the case for Pakistan, Sri-Lanka and Morocco, where the most prominent factors are those proceeding from the organizational factors. Once again, the role of the economic environment proves negligible except for Sri-Lanka. Finally, and in accordance with the “best practice” principle, simulations are of limited interest for South Africa, Brazil and Ecuador, where firms effectively benefit the most favorable environment.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Productive performance and its determinants have been studied for textile manufacturing by considering the “one step” stochastic frontier method. In the eight developing countries studied average firms’ efficiency broadly reflects international per capita GDP differences. South Africa, Brazil, and to some extent Ecuador, define the “best practice”. On the contrary, Egypt, India and Pakistan are poor productive performers with a high dispersion of efficiency across firms. The variance of firms’ inefficiency depends on some factors connected with in-house organization, but also on external components such as the economic and institutional environment.

We find that the most influential inefficiency determinants are connected with access to an overdraft facility, but also with some infrastructural services such as power supply and access to modern technology or the Internet that affect the quality of knowledge about market conditions. Among the organizational variables, the experience of the top manager proves significant in accordance with a “learning by doing” effect. Competition also matters through the stimulating impact of the agglomeration effect. As inefficiency determinants are correlated, principal component analyses have been used to aggregate information through several indices encapsulating three broad categories of factors: managerial know-how (e.g. in-house organizational efficiency), external economic environment, and institutions.

Empirical results have shown that firm’s productivity level is significantly influenced by these three broad categories of factors. Both managerial know-how and the institutional

environment are by far the most influential components. These results have been extended by simulations where we predict the productivity gains that could be obtained if firms had the opportunity of evolving in a more favorable environment. At the domestic level, nation-based simulations suggest that in-house organizational determinants prevail. For the eight country-sector based studied, the relative contribution of this component exceeds 70% of the total cumulated productivity gains. Simulations in the international environment display much more important productivity gains. In this framework, institutions prevail for three countries (Egypt, India, Ecuador). In Egypt, firm productivity level would be multiplied by nearly 4, the quality of institutions accounting for about 50% of this improvement. The role of the external environment including “hard infrastructure” is much less important. Productive performance may thus be increased by stimulating managerial efficiency and the driving mission of the State in the definition and application of efficient rules.

**Appendix 1 - Probit results for the sample selection bias**  
**(Inverse Mills Ratio)**

	<b>Model for the frontier with the individual z-determinants</b>	<b>Model for the frontier with the PCIND indices as z-determinants</b>
<b>Firm Size (permanent employment)</b>	-0.053 (0.082)	-0.199 (0.089)**
<b>Legal status of the firm</b>	-0.686 (0.321)**	-0.337 (0.215)
<b>Individual firm</b>	-0.570 (0.204)***	-0.148 (0.283)
<b>Family firm</b>	-0.361 (0.170)**	-0.352 (0.195)*
<b>Constant</b>	2.013 (0.399)***	2.703 (0.365)***
<b>Observations</b>	899	899
<b>% of correct prediction</b>	69.30	77.09

N.B. The two models refer to the same sample of observations but differ by the endogeneous dichotomous variable. The construction of the PCINDs requires more information about a larger number of variables. Therefore the percentage of non respondent firms is different. Standard errors in parentheses; \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. The regressions include countries dummies.

**Appendix 2 - Regressions for instrumentation of endogenous variables**

	<b>Overdraft facility</b>	<b>Access to the financial Constraint</b>	<b>Access to internet</b>
<b>Size</b>	-0.014 (0.018)	0.025 (0.060)	-0.020 (0.015)
<b>Foreign ownership (% of capital)</b>	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
<b>Export (% of sales)</b>	0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)*
<b>Overdraft facilities++</b>	0.978 (0.044)***	0.025 (0.133)	0.002 (0.041)
<b>Electricity constraint++</b>	0.006 (0.014)	0.004 (0.041)	0.003 (0.011)
<b>Education (% of workforce)</b>	0.005 (0.001)***	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)*
<b>Access to financial constraint++</b>	-0.002 (0.012)	1.012 (0.040)***	0.008 (0.013)
<b>Access to internet++</b>	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.114)	0.991 (0.037)*
<b>Experience of top manager</b>	0.001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)
<b>Agglomeration</b>	-0.002 (0.014)	0.007 (0.039)	0.001 (0.012)
<b>Corruption constraint++</b>	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.001 (0.011)
<b>Constant</b>	0.214 (0.227)	0.727 (0.534)	-0.048 (0.149)
<b>Observations</b>	1031	1001	1023
<b>R-squared</b>	0.55	0.48	0.49

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%. Regressions include country dummies

**PS:** ++ regional mean by firm size.

### Appendix 3 - Principal Components Analyses

Eigenvectors														
Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
_1++	0,22	0,04	-0,12	-0,47	0,09	0,71	0,31	0,01	0,26	0,06	-0,13	0,08	-0,10	0,04
_2	0,39	0,06	0,03	0,03	-0,08	0,05	0,08	-0,28	-0,55	-0,11	-0,38	-0,43	-0,01	0,26
_3	0,06	0,44	0,29	-0,05	-0,04	0,05	-0,14	-0,51	-0,07	-0,31	0,15	0,54	-0,08	0,07
_4	0,21	0,39	0,07	0,23	-0,10	-0,15	-0,09	0,20	0,31	0,22	-0,49	0,04	-0,35	0,19
_5	-0,02	0,44	0,25	-0,08	-0,04	-0,23	0,46	0,33	0,18	-0,16	0,03	-0,08	0,41	0,12
_6	0,34	-0,06	0,34	-0,30	-0,17	0,00	-0,20	0,08	0,00	-0,07	0,19	-0,23	0,37	-0,04
_7	0,32	-0,20	0,25	0,09	-0,04	-0,15	-0,01	-0,41	0,57	0,13	0,16	-0,28	-0,14	-0,14
_8	0,34	-0,21	0,26	0,11	0,10	-0,05	0,12	0,09	-0,21	0,36	-0,28	0,48	0,25	-0,41
_9	0,10	-0,09	0,23	0,16	0,88	0,05	-0,11	0,11	0,04	-0,20	0,01	-0,05	0,00	0,24
_10	0,26	0,19	-0,46	-0,17	0,08	-0,06	-0,61	0,06	0,14	0,09	-0,05	0,08	0,36	0,08
_11	0,39	0,00	-0,19	0,02	-0,05	-0,09	0,00	0,33	-0,02	-0,61	0,06	0,02	-0,34	-0,44
_12	0,36	-0,21	-0,05	-0,03	-0,14	-0,14	0,12	0,23	-0,14	0,19	0,46	0,27	-0,24	0,56
_13	0,22	0,03	-0,41	0,59	-0,02	0,16	0,31	-0,21	0,13	-0,11	0,14	0,06	0,37	0,05
_14	0,04	0,41	0,17	0,32	-0,01	0,43	-0,18	0,21	-0,20	0,31	0,40	-0,23	-0,11	-0,23
_15	0,10	0,33	-0,29	-0,30	0,36	-0,39	0,28	-0,23	-0,16	0,31	0,20	-0,12	-0,14	-0,24

N.B: ++ Regional average by firm size: **Starting a business**: (1) Corruption constraint: number of procedures, (2) cost (% of income per cap), (3) min capital (% of income per cap); **Hiring and Firing worker**: (4) difficulty of firing index, (5) cost of firing (weeks of salaries); **Registering property**: (6) time (days), (7) cost of property value; **Trading across borders**: (8) time for import, (9) cost to import, (us dollar per container); **Enforcing contracts**: (10) number of procedures, (11) time (days) and (12) costs (% of income per capita); **Closing a business**: (13) time (years); **Dealing with licenses**: (14) number of procedures and (15) cost (% of income per capita)

PCA			
Components	Eigenvalues	Proportions	Cumulative
1	5,65	0,38	0,38
2	3,71	0,25	0,62
3	1,29	0,09	0,71
4	1,15	0,08	0,79
5	1,03	0,07	0,86
6	0,75	0,05	0,91
7	0,42	0,03	0,93
8	0,33	0,02	0,96
9	0,24	0,02	0,97
10	0,15	0,01	0,98
11	0,08	0,01	0,99
12	0,07	0,00	0,99
13	0,07	0,00	1,00
14	0,03	0,00	1,00
15	0,01	0,00	1,00

**Principal Component Index (PCIND<sup>g</sup>): Managerial know-how and in-house organization**

<b>Eigenvectors</b>								
Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1- Formal training	0,44	0,09	-0,03	-0,45	0,25	0,20	0,61	0,34
2- Education (% of workforce)	0,34	-0,14	0,54	0,40	-0,10	-0,44	0,41	-0,22
3- Access to internet+	0,49	0,15	-0,09	-0,35	-0,08	0,07	-0,22	-0,74
4- Education of top manager	0,26	-0,60	0,16	0,23	0,50	0,43	-0,27	-0,01
5- Experience of top manager	0,05	0,75	0,37	0,31	0,24	0,36	-0,12	0,03
6- Foreign ownership (% of capital)	0,22	0,18	-0,62	0,37	0,48	-0,41	0,00	-0,01
7- Export (% of sales)	0,29	-0,03	-0,37	0,46	-0,57	0,46	0,17	0,06
8- Overdraft facilities+	0,50	0,05	0,13	-0,09	-0,24	-0,28	-0,55	0,54

+ predicted variables (Regressions in Appendix 2)

<b>PCA</b>			
Components	Eigenvalues	Proportions	Cumulative
1	2,23	0,28	0,28
2	1,07	0,13	0,41
3	1,02	0,13	0,54
4	1,00	0,12	0,66
5	0,88	0,11	0,77
6	0,76	0,10	0,87
7	0,55	0,07	0,94
8	0,49	0,06	1,00

**Principal Component Index (PCIND<sup>s</sup>): External economic environment**

<b>Eigenvectors</b>					
Variables	1	2	3	4	5
1- Agglomeration	0,13	0,69	0,70	0,05	0,10
2- Electricity constraint++	0,56	0,20	-0,20	0,10	-0,77
3- Telecom constraint++	0,56	0,06	-0,28	0,53	0,57
4- Transport constraint++	0,55	-0,15	0,07	-0,78	0,24
5- Access to financial constraint+	0,23	-0,67	0,62	0,31	-0,13

++ Regional mean averages by firm size; + predicted variables (see Appendix 2)

<b>PCA</b>			
Components	Eigenvalue	Proportion	Cumulative
1	1,98	0,40	0,40
2	1,11	0,22	0,62
3	0,87	0,17	0,79
4	0,55	0,11	0,90
5	0,48	0,10	1,00

**Appendix 4 - Heckman's sample selectivity correction**

In a first regression a Probit model is estimated as follows:

$$h_i = W_i\theta + \omega_i \quad (7)$$

$h_i$  is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm gives the full information on all the variables needed for the “one step” method, and 0 if we only have partial information.  $W_i$  is the vector of firm characteristics, with some of them underlying the attrition of the initial sample and  $\theta$  the parameters to be estimated while  $\omega_i$  is the usual random error term. The variables retained and the estimation results are reported in Appendix 1. The measurement of Heckman’s selection bias is obtained after the estimation of the Probit model according to:  $\rho_i = \frac{\phi(W_i\theta)}{\Phi(W_i\theta)}$  (8), where  $\phi(\cdot)$  and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  refer to the normal probability and the normal cumulative distribution, respectively. The factor correction is the inverse Mills ratio denoted  $\rho_i$ . As we don’t know where the potential bias arises, this factor has been potentially introduced in the production technology (1) and/or in the inefficiency determinants (2).

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